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Religion as Non-religion: The Place of Chinese Temples 
in Phuket, Southern Thailand
Tatsuki Kataoka*
This paper, based on a case study of Chinese temples in Phuket, aims to demon-
strate the importance of religious activities lying outside “religion” in the so-called 
“Buddhist” societies in Thailand, as well as to question the category of “religion” 
itself.
In Thailand, most of the Chinese temples (called sanchao in Thai) are not 
recognized as “religious places” by the religious administration (namely the Depart-
ment of Religious Affairs), since they come under the supervision of the Ministry 
of the Interior.  In Phuket, Chinese temples as “non-religious” places (of worship?) 
outnumber officially recognized Buddhist temples and they offer occasions for the 
worship of Buddhist deities.  One of the unique features of the “Buddhist” activities 
of the Chinese temples in Phuket is that they are conducted without monks.  Because 
the Chinese temples are placed outside the state protection of “religion,” they are 
not institutionalized as belonging to any state-approved religion.  This is beneficial 
to the Chinese temples as they do not have to compete with “state Buddhism”; in 
such temples indiscriminate syncretic worship is also latently sanctioned.  In Phuket 
the functions of Chinese associations and charity foundations overlap with those of 
the Chinese temples, challenging the definition of religion in yet another way.  Our 
discussion leads us to conclude that all these activities lying outside of “religion” 
actually occupy an important part of “Buddhism” in Thailand.  Thus a reconsidera-
tion of the framework of “Buddhism” and “religion” in Thailand is necessary.
Keywords: Thailand, Chinese, Chinese temples, Buddhism, religion, Phuket
I Introduction
This paper aims to reconsider discussions on “Thai Buddhism” from its margins—from 
the perspective of Chinese temples.  One of my motivations for presenting this paper is 
the existing debate on Thai Buddhism and Chinese societies in Thailand.  There is a 
well-established model for approaching Thai Buddhism—one that stresses the impor-
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tance of the Sangha and how Buddhist society maintains its equilibrium through the 
merit-oriented practices of laypeople, which supplement the nirvana-oriented orthodoxy 
by monks (Ishii 1986).  This model is very clear and consistent.
Of course, Sangha-centered Buddhism officially supported by the government is 
only one part of real Buddhism in Thailand, and ritual practices related to spirit worship 
are well documented and repeatedly discussed.1)  In my paper I extend this trend of 
academic attention to the margins of Buddhism, to question the very categories of Bud-
dhism and religion.  I refer to Chinese temples, which are supposed to form a large part 
of the religious activities of statistical Buddhists in Thailand, but which are not seriously 
argued.
Buddhism in Thailand is always presented as if it were a cultural tradition of the 
Thai, or even a synonym.2)  In actual fact, the composition of “Buddhist society” is far 
more complex and the Theravada school is but one of the religious traditions that appear 
as Buddhism in statistics.  The Chinese of Thailand form an inseparable part of this 
complexity, but unfortunately, with only a few exceptions, discussions on the Chinese 
and their culture in Thailand seem to have paid little attention to this issue—Buddhism 
as viewed from the Chinese perspective.3)
In this paper I will first review the development of the modern category of religion 
and government policies toward it, and show that Chinese temples have not been included 
in this system.  Then I will turn my attention to the findings from my case study in 
Phuket, one of the regional cities that have been developed mainly by Chinese immi-
grants.  An overview of the current situation of Chinese temples in Phuket will be pre-
sented before further discussions on the status of Chinese temples and related activities 
as “religion-as-non-religion.”  I will proceed to connect arguments on the anonymous 
nature of “Chinese Religion” to the unique allocation of religious discourse in Thailand, 
and demonstrate that it is this combination that leaves Chinese temples in Thailand in 
the domain of “non-religion.”  Finally I will show the possibilities for further comparative 
1) Tambiah (1970) is representative of the pioneer works on this subject.  In general, anthropologists 
working on Buddhism in Thailand tend more or less to stress the diversity of religious practices 
outside the Sangha.
2) “Thais believe themselves to be born Buddhists, that the words Thai and Buddhist are synony-
mous”(Ishii 1986, 39).  For another example, see Keyes (1989).
3) Surprisingly enough, more attention has been paid to the role of the Chinese in Theravada Buddhism 
in Malaysia than in Thailand.  It has been pointed out that in Kelantan, the Chinese and Thai main-
tain a symbiotic relationship in support of the Theravada Buddhist tradition there (Kershaw 1981; 
Mohamed Yusoff Ismail 1993).  In Thailand, Boonsanong (1971) and Tobias (1977), for example, 
argued the Chinese acceptance of Thai Buddhism.  However, the place of Chinese temples within 
“Thai Buddhism” as a system has not received sufficient attention from scholars in Thai studies.
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studies of religions in Thailand in order to rethink the conventional understanding of 
religion in Southeast Asia.
II “Religion,” Buddhism, and Chinese Temples
The Making of Religion
Prior to the administrative reform in the last half of the nineteenth century, the term 
satsana, which denotes religion in the present sense, was a synonym of Buddhism.  Kings 
enjoyed the title of “the Supreme Defender of Satsana,” with satsana denoting Buddhism 
exclusively in this context.  As in other Asian countries, “religion” as a neutral term of 
comparative religion is a relatively recent invention in Thailand.  Furthermore, a feature 
of Buddhism in pre-modern Thailand was the absence of nationwide monastic institutions. 
The vast majority of the land was dominated by semi-independent local crowns, and the 
King’s direct rule was limited to royal temples around the capital.  This situation changed 
dramatically after the Sangha Administration Act was introduced in 1902.  This act 
brought about present-day Thai Buddhism as a uniform institution, which Ishii calls “State 
Buddhism” (1986, 59).  It officialized and standardized a set of regulations on the doctrine 
taught in monasteries, as well as the status of ordained monks, and organized these 
monasteries and monks into a single bureaucratic pyramid officially sanctioned by the 
central government.
Extension of the coverage of the term satsana took place alongside the moderniza-
tion of Theravada Buddhism.  One of the first turning points was the “Edict of Religious 
Toleration” issued by King Chulalongkorn in 1878 (Wells 1958, 59–64).  This royal edict 
was targeted at the evangelical works of Christian missionaries in Chiang Mai, the north-
ern capital of present-day Thailand.  This edict referred to Christianity as “Satsana Phra 
Yesu” or “Satsana of Jesus,” and manifestly stated that one’s satsana was a matter of 
freedom of faith (Prasit 1984, 169).
King Vajiravudh, the successor to Chulalongkorn who governed the kingdom in the 
early twentieth century, established and propagated the state ideology: “chat, satsana, 
phramahakasat” (nation, religion, monarchy).  In this context satsana is Buddhism as the 
de facto state religion.  According to Vella, this propagation of Buddhism was based on the 
king’s assumption that the Thai people have historically selected Buddhism among reli-
gions of essentially equal standing: “Time after time the King pointed out the basic simi-
larities of all religions.  All religions taught their adherents a similar moral code; they taught 
men to do good, not to harm others” (Vella 1978, 220–221).  For this young monarch, 
educated in England, Western-style religious pluralism was already a self-evident truth.
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After the constitutional revolution in 1932, the king’s title as “the Supreme Defender 
of Satsana” persisted with the introduction of the idea of “freedom of satsana” or “free-
dom of religion.”  These contradict each other so far as satsana is defined as Buddhism. 
The usage of satsana to denote religion in general can be traced to this period.  The phrase 
“protection of satsana” in the constitution was translated in English as “protection of all 
religions professed by the Siamese people,” and thus was established the system in which 
religions enjoyed equal status under royal patronage.  “[I]n this light, the semantic expan-
sion of satsana is probably best understood as an accommodation of the traditional values 
to the context of Western, European democracy” (Ishii 1986, 39).
In 1941, a Department of Religious Affairs (Krom Kansatsana) was created under 
the Ministry of Education to supervise all religions recognized by the state or all religions 
under royal patronage.  It replaced the Krom Thammakan, which had formerly superin-
tended violation of the Buddhist precepts by monks (Sutthiwong 2001).4)  In 2002, it was 
transferred to the newly created Ministry of Culture, while some of its functions relating 
to the administration of Buddhism were carved off for the equally new National Office of 
Buddhism.  Religious organizations officially registered with the Department include 
Islam, Christianity (Catholic and Protestant as separate categories), Brahmanism, Hindu, 
and Sikh, as well as Buddhism.  As for Buddhism, the Thai Sangha (Theravada) and two 
Mahayana sects (“Chinese” Chin Nikai and “Vietnamese” Annam Nikai, though both are 
actually Chinese) are listed in the religious statistics of the government (Thailand, Krom 
Kansatsana 1998).
This brief summary of the development of religious administration in Thailand 
shows that the traditional model of state administration for Buddhism has been extended 
to cover other religions as satsana has been redefined as a general term for religions. 
The consequence of this development is the concentration of the state’s interests in the 
registration and control of ordained religious professionals and their facilities.  Laypeople 
are left out of the scope of the religious administration, and the minimum requirement 
for laypeople is simply to select one religion on their ID cards.  In addition, such self-
declaration of one’s religion does not require details of one’s affiliation or allegiance to 
any sect or denomination.  In other words, the exact number of Theravada and Mahayana 
lay followers among Buddhists is not known.  It is also worth noting that Confucianism 
and Taoism are not listed among the officially recognized religions.  The only choice 
offered by the state to the Chinese (with the exception of small numbers of Christians 
and Muslims) is Buddhism.
4) Tambiah (1976, 370–379) analyzes the role of the Department of Religious Affairs in the Sangha 
administration, although he hardly mentions the Department’s control of non-Buddhist religions.
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Chinese Temples and the Thai State
Where, then, is the place for Chinese temples within these officially recognized religious 
categories?  The answer is that there is no place for them since Chinese temples regis-
ter with the Ministry of the Interior, not the Department of Religious Affairs under the 
Ministry of Education (after 2002, the Ministry of Culture).  The Chinese temple that I 
refer to in this paper is an English translation of sanchao Chin, which is strictly distin-
guished from ordinary Buddhist temples called wat.  The Chinese temple must seek 
legitimacy on grounds other than the religious administration.
Legally speaking, government control of Chinese temples is based on an order 
issued by the Ministry of the Interior in 1920.  This order was originally aimed at supple-
menting the shortcomings of the Local Administration Act (1913), especially Article 113 
on the protection of property rights of public places for merit-making (kusonsathan). 
Article 2 of the ministry’s order defines sanchao (Chinese temples and other shrines) as 
“places to have objects of worship and used for rituals according to doctrines (latthi) of 
the Chinese and other people.”  The Department of Local Administration has the duty 
of supervising Chinese temples listed in the Directory of Chinese Temples in the Kingdom
published by the department (Thailand, Krom Kanpokkhrong 2000).
A comparative study of Chinese temples of Bangkok and Singapore by Pornpan and 
Mak (1994) presents unique data of the historical development of Chinese religions in 
Thailand.  According to this study, the number of Chinese Buddhist temples in Bangkok 
is smaller than in Singapore.  The authors suppose that this is because Buddhism is much 
better established and flourishing in Bangkok than it is in Singapore—Theravada mon-
asteries were so scattered over the kingdom that the lack of Mahayana temples would 
cause no serious problem for Chinese immigrants.
Scholars have long agreed that the cultural distance between Chinese immigrants 
and host majorities is remarkably small in Thailand in the sense that both parties are 
more or less Buddhists in a broad sense.  The case of Chinese immigrants who show no 
hesitation in claiming themselves to be Buddhists has been reported in many academic 
writings on Chinese in Thailand: “[O]bservers are impressed not so much by differences 
as religious similarities between the Thai and the Chinese minority,” and “unlike the 
situation with respect to the Chinese in other countries of Southeast Asia, in Thailand 
religion does offer one base on which cultural compromise is being achieved” (Coughlin 
1960, 92).  Some Chinese folk traditions even contributed to such cultural compromise. 
As Skinner (1957, 129) points out, San Pao Kong (Sanbaogong 三保公), one of the 
popular Chinese deities, has another name Cheng Ho (Zheng He鄭和, a leader of Ming 
China’s maritime expedition), while his name also symbolizes the three essentials of 
Buddhist teaching, San Pao 三寶 (Three Treasures), since these two terms share the 
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same pronunciation.  That cultural compromise between Chinese immigrants and the 
host Thai Buddhists was easily achieved partly explains the delayed introduction of 
Chinese Mahayana monasteries to Thailand, since Chinese temples of folk religion and 
Theravada monasteries filled the religious needs of the Chinese Buddhists.
In Bangkok, the first Chinese temple established in 1786 was dedicated to  Pun Thao 
Kong本頭公, a deity of locality worshipped in Southeast Asia (Pornpan and Mak 1994, 
28–29, 137).  All the Chinese temples built in the first half of the nineteenth century were 
temples of Taoism or local folk beliefs, while Chinese Mahayana Buddhist temples were 
introduced much later.  The first Chinese Mahayana temple of Thailand was established 
in 1887 (ibid., 29).  Actually, only four Mahayana temples5) in Bangkok were built before 
1915 (ibid., 140).  All these facts indicate that Mahayana Buddhist temples were an abso-
lute minority among the Chinese temples at the time of the legislation of the Sangha Act 
(1902) and the Interior Ministry’s order (1920).
Another factor behind the legal status of Chinese temples is the government’s pol-
icy towards Chinese immigrants.  As Nipaporn (2012) argues, Chinese immigrants’ 
activities in the public sphere were almost neglected by the Bangkok government in the 
initial period of modernization (late nineteenth to early twentieth century).  Most of the 
infrastructure of public welfare for the Chinese settlements was initiated and provided 
by associations of speech groups (or coalitions of them), not the royal government, on a 
self-supporting basis (ibid.).  Such welfare organizations have a tendency to overlap with 
Chinese temples.  For example, the Cantonese Temple and Cantonese Hospital of Bang-
kok are located in the same compound as the Cantonese Association.  Tianhua Hospital 
天華醫院, which was jointly founded by five speech groups (Swatou, Canton, Hokkian, 
Hakka, and Hailam) in 1905, has a large Kuan Im 觀音 temple in its center.  Po Tek Tung 
or Baode Shantang報徳善堂, founded in 1910, is the largest philanthropic association in 
the kingdom as well as a temple for the worship of Dafeng Zushi 大峰祖師, a former 
Mahayana monk in China famous for his devotion to public activities (issues on philan-
thropic associations will be discussed later).  Also, this philanthropic association is the 
owner of Huachiao Hospital華僑醫院.  Such associations “provide the Chinese popula-
tion with schools, community centers, hospitals, clinics, temples, cemeteries and recre-
ational facilities” (Coughlin 1960, 33–34).  Unlike Theravada monasteries, Chinese 
temples began in Thailand as a welfare center for this neglected community lying outside 
of government care.
Later, a series of government policies towards the Chinese was legislated during 
the reign of King Vajiravudh, for example, the Association Act (1914) and the Private 
5) One such temple is a samnaksong, which has lesser status than an official monastery (wat).
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School Act (1918).  Although these legislations sound universal, they were actually tar-
geted at gaining effective control of the Chinese immigrants (Vella 1978, 189–190).  The 
Association Act was “aimed particularly at preventing the formation of Chinese associa-
tions reflecting the new political enthusiasms generated by events in China” (ibid., 189), 
and “[w]hat the private school law of 1918 was supposed to do was facilitate the assimi-
lation of Chinese” (ibid., 190).  Similarly, even though the Interior Ministry’s order on 
sanchao under Vajiravudh’s reign is a regulation measure on shrines in general (Chinese 
and non-Chinese alike), Article 2 (mentioned above) shows that its first target was actu-
ally Chinese temples.  This ministry’s order also forms a link in the chain of contemporary 
policies to enforce a strict policing of the Chinese by legitimizing their activities and 
organizations.  According to Koizumi (2007, 33–44), Chinese community leaders in Bang-
kok initially tried to resist the legislation on Chinese temples and petitioned the govern-
ment for amendment of the acts.  The petitions presented to the government were finally 
rejected on the grounds that strict state regulation was necessary because Chinese 
temples might harbor secret societies and other illegal activities.
Since the “Chinese problem” was a matter of policing rather than purification of 
“State Buddhism,” and since Mahayana monasteries were an absolute minority even 
among the Chinese temples, most of the Chinese religious facilities (temples and semi-
religious associations) have been dropped from issues of religion and placed in the hands 
of the Ministry of the Interior.  According to the government policy toward the Chinese 
immigrants, Chinese temples or related organizations might register as an association 
with no political intention or as a Chinese temple outside “religion” (unless it has no 
ordained monk).  Chinese immigrants have been periodically victimized by the Bangkok 
government’s nationalistic policy.  In the early twentieth century they were suspected 
to be troublemakers instigated by Sun Yat-sen’s republican ideology, and later they were 
viewed as potential communists in the Cold War period (Skinner 1957).  Indeed, through-
out the twentieth century, the Thai government did not offer a special category to  Chinese 
religions to register as religions.
A good example is Dejiao 徳教, which was introduced to Thailand from China in the 
early 1950s.  This is a syncretic religious movement that originated in post-World War 
II China and spread to Southeast Asia.  In spite of its unique tradition and the religious 
connotation of its name (jiao means religion), the official status of its branches in Thailand 
is “philanthropic foundations,” and it has never been recognized as a religion.  Since the 
beginnings of this religious movement in the 1950s, the Thai Government “severely 
controlled registration of new Chinese associations, especially those whose stated 
purpose involved religious activities” (Formoso 2010, 59–60).
Table 1 shows the number of followers and religious places of each officially recog-
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nized religion.  As mentioned above, the statistics are obtained from self-declaration.  As 
for satsanasathan, or religious places, the official definition is “places that have ordained 
persons (nak buat) and used for religious rites” (Thailand, Samnak-ngan Khana  Kammakan 
Kansuksa haeng Chat 2000, 5).  Naturally, this definition does not include Chinese tem-
ples since, as I will argue later, rituals in Chinese temples tend to be carried out without 
ordained monks.  That is why Chinese temples never appear in such lists of “religious 
places” in an official sense.  The exceptions are Mahayana Buddhist temples with their 
own resident monks.  The Mahayana School of Buddhism, together with the Mahanikai 
and Thammayut Theravada Schools, forms a part of official “State Buddhism.”
Table 2 shows the number of Buddhist temples according to each sect, recognized 
by the Department of Religious Affairs (in 1998).  Official data on Buddhist sects contain 
only temples and monks, and the number of laypeople is not disclosed.  This reflects a 
state interest in religious affairs that is almost exclusively concentrated on the control 
of temples and ordained monks.  As already mentioned above, in official statistics, lay-
people are never classified according to sects.
Another remarkable feature of this data is the very small number of Mahayana 
temples (Chinese and Vietnamese).  This is partly because similar facilities tend to reg-
Table 1 Religious Population and Religious Places Officially Recognized by the Government
Religion Population Number of Religious Places
Buddhism 57,357,862 30,685
Islam 2,977,434 3,109
Christianity 1,012,871 640 (Catholic)
213 (Protestant)
Brahmanism, Hinduism, Sikh 21,125 25
Others 96,886
Total 61,466,178
Source: Thailand, Krom Kansatsana (1998, 94)
Table 2 Number of Buddhist Temples According to Sects
Branch Sect Private Royal Total
Theravada Mahanikai 28,982 199 29,181
Thammayut 1,433 52 1,485
Mahayana Chin (Chinese) 8 0 8
Annam (Vietnamese) 11 0 11
Total 30,434 251 30,685
Source: Thailand, Krom Kansatsana (1998, 84)
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ister with the Ministry of the Interior as sanchao or Chinese temples (and are thus non-
religious places).  Indeed, Chinese temples (657 temples nationwide) outnumber 
Mahayana temples, even though their number and the number of their followers are 
never listed in government statistics on religion.  From these statistics, we can suppose 
that the Chinese people attending Chinese temples declare themselves as Buddhists 
(who make up 93.3 percent of the total population, see Table 1) in population statistics.
Throughout Thailand’s modern history, the term “satsana” in the official sense has 
been transformed or extended from meaning “Buddhism” only to meaning “religions” in 
general.  Nevertheless, large areas of religious activities (including public facilities for 
worship) are still left outside this extended concept of religion.  Chinese temples are 
typical cases.6)
III Chinese Temples in Phuket
Phuket in Religious Statistics
Phuket has a unique history of the development of tin-mining through the introduction 
of Chinese immigrants from the British Straits Settlements during the modernization 
period.7)  The majority of Phuket’s population—72.6 percent—is Buddhist (see Table 3). 
Since attendants of Chinese temples are not officially categorized under the government’s 
policy towards religion, they are included as Buddhists.  Government statistics reveal an 
interesting characteristic of Buddhism in Phuket.  Table 4, indicating the population per 
monk and Buddhist temple, shows us how low commitment to officially institutionalized 
Buddhism is in Phuket.  In Phuket, one monk takes care of 1,541.37 people, while the 
average population per monk in Thailand is 326.08.  The same tendency is found in the 
distribution of Buddhist temples.  The population per temple in Phuket (7,458.26) is also 
much higher than the national equivalent of 2,003.13.  Thus the density of Buddhist 
temples and ordained monks is surprisingly lower than that in other provinces, and leads 
us to suppose that Buddhists in Phuket maintain their commitment to Buddhism in ways 
6) For a more nuanced understanding, I have to point out that the religious nature of Chinese temples 
has not always been neglected by the authorities.  Article 12 of the ministry’s order on sanchao
states that managers of each sanchao shall include faith (khaorop napthu) in its teaching (latthi).  As 
this statement shows, the government knows full well that the activities of Chinese temples are 
carried out according to religious belief.  However, my point is that, even though the religious nature 
of Chinese temples is recognized by the government, they have no place in officially defined religion 
and are supervised in “secular channels” only.
7) For details of the modern history of Phuket and the role of the Chinese, see Phuwadon (1988) and 
Cushman (1989, 1991).
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other than those expected by institutionalized Thai Buddhism.  The percentage of the 
population of Phuket province in the national total is 0.4 percent and that of Buddhist 
temples is much lower (0.1 percent), whereas that of Chinese temples is 1.5 percent (10 
out of 657 state temples).  These figures indicate that Chinese temples are more con-
centrated than Buddhist  temples in Phuket.
Since Phuket province has no Mahayana Buddhist temple, all the Chinese temples 
in Phuket are non-religious places in the official sense.  Their legal status falls into three 
categories: state, private, and non-registered.  The difference between state and private 
temples lies in land ownership.  Temples located on state-owned land are categorized as 
state temples, and those on private land are private temples.  Currently there are 10 state 
Chinese temples, 14 private temples, and at least 18 non-registered temples in Phuket. 
Apart from Chinese temples, there are six temples dedicated to Muslim guardians of 
locality.  As I will discuss later, these temples and the deities in them are closely con-
nected to Chinese temples.  All the Muslim guardian temples are non-registered.
The situation of the Chinese temples of Phuket tells us that non-registered temples 
are by no means exceptional.  Many Chinese temples are excluded from the registration 
system of Chinese temples by the Ministry of the Interior, which is itself beyond the 
religious administration of the state (the Department of Religious Affairs).  In fact, state 
control of religion based on the official definitions of satsana and satsanasathan has only 
a very partial hold on religious facilities.
Table 3 Religious Population and Religious Places in Phuket Province
Religion Population Number of Religious Places
Buddhism 167,878 31
Islam 59,017 38
Christianity 2,874 3 (Catholic)
0 (Protestant)
Brahmanism, Hinduism, Sikh 1,437 2
Others 0 0
Total 231,206
Source: Thailand, Krom Kansatsana (1998, 99)
Table 4 Population per Wat and per Monk
Per Wat Per Monk
Phuket 7,458.26 1,541.37
National average 2,003.13 326.08
Source: Thailand, Krom Kansatsana (1998, 79, 83)
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Deities Worshipped
Which deities are worshipped in these “non-religious” places?  According to Tables 5, 6, 
and 7, showing data on deities worshipped in the Chinese temples in Phuket, the most 
popular deities as owners of temples are Pun Thao Kong (Bentougong本頭公 or Hude 
Zhengshen 福徳正神, worshipped in six temples), Cho Su Kong (Qingshui Zushi清水
祖師, worshipped in four temples), and Kuan Wu (Guanyu 関羽, worshipped in four 
temples).  These are followed by Lim Thai Su (Linfu Taishi 林府太師) and Kuan Im 
(Guanyin 觀音), each worshipped as an owner deity in three temples.
Taoism or Chinese popular religions outnumber Buddhism at the level of owner 
deities of temples.  However, this does not mean that Buddhism is not important in 
Chinese temples.  The vast majority of temples (26) have Mahayana Buddhist deities in 
their pantheon as lesser objects of worship.  Of these 26 temples, all have Kuan Im, and 
some have an additional Mahayana Buddhist object of worship such as Mitreya弥勒佛, 
Ti Chong Ong地蔵王菩薩, and other Bodhisattvas.  Some temples are more oriented to 
official Buddhist temples.  A good example is Sam Se Chu Fut temple (No. 23 in Table 
7).  Although this temple is officially a non-registered sanchao, the structure of its 
pantheon is actually very Buddhist.  Sam Se Chu Fut三世諸佛 or the Three Buddhas of 
the Mahayana school are its owners, while the majority of its lesser deities are also 
Mahayana Buddhist deities.  The difference between this kind of sanchao and Buddhist 
temples (wat) lies in the absence of ordained monks and daily chanting carried out by lay 
practitioners in the latter.
Worship of Buddha and Buddhist deities can be practiced in most of the Chinese 
temples, even though these temples are never recognized as Buddhist “religious places.” 
These sanchao, or Chinese temples as non-religious places, offer alternatives for the 
practice of Buddhism outside state sanction.  One could also worship deities of several 
religious traditions other than Mahayana Buddhism at these temples.  Former Theravada 
monks constitute the objects of worship in the pantheons of Chinese temples in Phuket. 
The most prominent of these monks is Luangpho Chaem, who was active in the late 
nineteenth century and is purported to have supernatural powers.  His picture is still 
worshipped all over the province, including in two Chinese temples (No. 4 and No. 13 in 
Table 7).  In Lo Rong temple (No. 9), one can worship various images of former Theravada 
monks as well as other deities, Buddhist and non-Buddhist.
The structure of the pantheons of some Chinese temples is almost ecumenical.  Lo 
Rong is an example of such a “department store” of religious amalgam.  Yok Ong Song 
Te (Yuhuang Dadi玉皇上帝), Nine Emperor God or Kiu Ong Tai Te (Jiuhuang Dadi九
皇大帝), Lao-tze (Taishang Laojun 太上老君), Ma Cho (Mazu 媽祖), Sam Tong Ong 
(Sanzhongwang 三忠王), Pun Thao Kong, Sakya Muni, Kuan Im, Mitreya, Ti Chong Ong, 
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ancestor gods of the Tan and Koi clans, Phra Phran (the Thai name for a god of Brahmanic 
or Hindu tradition), and other popular gods, in addition to the Theravada monks men-
tioned above, are all found in one single temple.  Another example is a very small temple 
Hiap Thian (No. 40), dedicated to Kuan Wu, Kuan Im, Siva, and Uma Devi.  The com-
position of its pantheon reflects the founders’ intention to unite three Asian religions, 
namely Chinese popular religion, Buddhism, and Hinduism.
Islamic tradition is sometimes also invited into such mixed pantheons.  Muslim 
guardian spirits of locality are worshipped as lesser deities in five Chinese temples.  This 
custom stems from the belief that the founders (and, as such, guardians of locality) of the 
island of Phuket were Muslim.  The Chinese, as newcomers, thus had to ask the founder 
spirits for permission to settle.  Since then, these guardian spirits (called to) have been 
placed in Chinese temples in typical Muslim attire, including the Muslim costume and 
cap.  Symbolized by a crescent and the color green, these spirits receive offerings (with 
prohibitions on pork and liquor) on Fridays, and are said to speak Arabic on occasions of 
possession.  The Phuket Chinese see this custom as a way to pay respect to the local 
Muslim tradition, although the worship of images through the offering of joss sticks 
causes protests from some strict Muslim leaders.
Temples No. 43–48 in Table 7 are not regarded as Chinese temples, but temples of 
Muslim guardian spirits of locality.  Nonetheless, they are closely related to the Chinese 
temples in the composition of their pantheons.  They share the same deities as the Chi-
nese temples; Chinese-style altars of Thi Kong 天公 (Heaven God, sometimes referred 
to as Yok Ong Song Te) are placed in front of the temples; images of Kuan Wu, Kuan 
Im, Mitreya, and Ho Ia (Huye 虎爺, a land spirit) appear in assistance of the Muslim 
guardians, which are themselves worshipped in some Chinese temples under the same 
names (To Sae, To Tami, To Saming, etc.).
According to Wee (1976, 171), who has studied religion in Singapore, Chinese Reli-
gion is “an empty bowl, which can variously be filled with the contents of institutionalized 
religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, the Chinese syncretic religions, or 
even Christianity (Catholic) and Hinduism.”  As such, “Sakyamuni Buddha is just another 
shen (Chinese deity); the Theravada and Mahayana temples are his temples, and the 
Theravada and Mahayana Buddhists are his group of devotees” (ibid., 172–173).  In Phuket, 
this “empty bowl” orientation of Chinese Religion is even extended to Muslim guardians.8)
8) Wee (1976, 173) states categorically that such extension is not applied to Islam and Protestant 
Christianity, since these religions do not have images.  Nevertheless, the very existence of the 
Datuk Kong worship in Malaysia, which corresponds to the worship of to in Phuket, proves that 
some kinds of Islamic beliefs can be re-interpreted by and incorporated into Chinese Religion.  For 
details of Datuk Kong worship see Cheu (1992).
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Indeed, in Chinese temples we find deities from Theravada Buddhism, Mahayana Bud-
dhism, Taoism, Hinduism, Islam, Chinese popular religion, and local spirits worshipped 
together in one place.  However, this description may be misleading, since the pantheon 
of the Chinese temples in Phuket seems to reject the very demarcation of institu-
tionalized religions.  For outside observers, it is almost impossible to identify each 
temple’s religious affiliation in institutionalized terms.  This causes no problem, however, 
since these places are not officially recognized “religious places.”  Chinese temples 
are simply “non-religion” and there is thus no need for the identification of religious 
affiliation.
Buddhism without Monks
Another unique aspect of “Thai Buddhism” practiced by the Chinese in Phuket is that 
most of the ritual practices in Chinese temples are conducted without ordained monks. 
Ritual specialists are laypeople with various titles like ajarn, shifu, songjingyuan and so 
Table 5 Main (Owner) Deities of the Chinese Temples in Phuket
Deities Number of Temples to Worship
Taoism/Chinese popular religion 38
Pun Thao Kong  本頭公 6
Cho Su Kong 清水祖師 4
Kuan Wu 関羽/協天大帝 4
Lim Thai Su  林府太師 3
Koi Seng Ong 廣澤尊王/郭聖王 2
Ma Cho 媽祖/天上聖母 2
Ong Ia  王爺類 2
Thian Fu Nguan Soi  田府元帥 2
Yok Ong Song Te  玉皇上帝 2
Others 11
Mahayana Buddhism 4
Kuan Im 觀音 3
Sam Se Chu Fut 三世諸佛 1
Table 6 Lesser Deities of the Chinese Temples of Phuket Classified
According to Religious Tradition
Composition of Pantheon Number of Temples
Including Mahayana Buddhist deities 26
Including Theravada Buddhist deities 3
Including Muslim guardians of locality 5
Including Hindu-Brahman deities 2
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Table 7 Status of Chinese Temples in Phuket






1 佛祖庵 Putcho Muang Kuan Im（觀音） ○ Chuitui
2 觀世音菩薩 Chao Mae Kuan Im Muang Kuan Im（觀音） ○
3 天后宮 Mae Ya Nan Muang Ma Cho（媽祖／天上聖母） ○
4 福元宮 Cho Su Kong Muang Cho Su Kong（清水祖師） ○
5 勝徳廟 Pho To Kong Muang Pun Thao Kong（本頭公／福徳正神） ○ Phonmanisi
6 汾陽堂 Koi Seng Ong Muang Koi Seng Ong（廣澤尊王） ○
7 網寮斗母宮 Bang Niao Muang Sam Tong Ong（三忠王） ○ Thep Rasi
8 水碓斗母宮 Chui Tui Muang Thian Fu Nguan Soi（田府元帥） ○ Chuitui
9 瑞文堂 Lo Rong Muang Cho Su Kong（清水祖師） ○
10 青龍宮 Cheng Ong Muang Kang Fu Ong Ia（江府王爺） ○
11 雲山宮 Sam Kong Muang Lim Thai Su（林府大師） ○
12 玉渓宮 Yok Ke Keng Muang Cho Su Kong（清水祖師） ○
13 太原堂 Cho Ong Muang Ong Clan Guardian（忠懿尊王） ○





Kiu Leng Thong Muang Lim Clan Guardian（晋安尊王？） ○
16 瓊州會館 Hailam Muang Shui Wei Sheng Niang（水尾聖娘） ○
17 肜雲宮 Thungkha Muang Lim Thai Su（林府太師） ○
18 鳳山寺 Hongsanshi Muang Koi Seng Ong（廣澤尊王） ○
19 九天宮 Saphan Hin Muang Kiu Tian Hian Nu（九天玄女） ○ Chuitui
20 協天宮 Sapam Muang Kuan Wu（関羽） ○
21 紫蓮宮 Nabon Muang Kuan Wu（関羽） ○
22 三官大帝 Ban Khu Muang Sam Kuan Tai Te（三官大帝） ○
23 三世諸佛 Sam Se Chu Fut Muang Sam Se Chu Fut（三世諸佛） ○
24 七星娘娘 Chit Chiao Muang Chit Sae Niao（七星娘娘） ○ Chitsaeniao
25 福山宮 Hok San Keng Muang Pun Thao Kong（本頭公／福徳正神） ○
26 雲從庵 Nakha Muang Cho Su Kong（清水祖師） ○
27 内杼斗母宮 Kathu Kathu Thian Fu Nguan Soi（田府元帥） ○
28 忠勇祠 Tong Yong Su Kathu Tablets of the Dead ○
29 福善堂 Hok Shian Thong Kathu Pun Thao Kong（本頭公／福徳正神） ○
30 源福宮 Nguan Hok Keng Kathu Pun Thao Kong（本頭公／福徳正神） ○
31 福生宮 Hok Se Keng/ Chao Pho Sua Kathu
Pun Thao Kong
（本頭公／福徳正神） ○
32 福善壇 Hok Sian Tua Kathu Pun Thao Kong（本頭公／福徳正神） ○
33 武當山玄天上帝 Thung Thong Kathu
Hian Thian Song Te
（玄天上帝） ○
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on.9)  They chant Chinese sutras in the Hokkien dialect, known locally in Hokkien  Chinese 
as songkeng 誦經.  Since Phuket has no Mahayana temple, there is no alternative of 
inviting Mahayana monks for songkeng.  This songkeng is clearly distinguished from suat 
mon, which denotes the chanting of Pali sutras by Theravada monks.
One of the occasions for songkeng to take place publicly is Pho To (Pudu普度),10) a 
ritual widely practiced all over the island whereby offerings are made to the dead during 
the seventh lunar month.  In Phuket City, Pho To is celebrated in eight places annually 
(Table 8)—four in Chinese temples, two in a former Chinese temple, and the remaining 
two on community streets.  The Pho To ritual is based on the belief that dead persons 
come back to this world during the seventh lunar month.  Those with descendants will go 
back to their homes while others with no place to go may eventually harm living people. 
Table 7–Continued






34 福龍宮 Tha Rua Thalang Po Seng Tai Te（保生大帝） ○
35 金士王宮 Ban Khon Thalang Kuan Im（觀音） ○
36 三王府（金飛殿） Cheun Thale Thalang
Sam Fu Ong Yia
（三府王爺） ○
37 雲山宮 Lim Thai Su Thalang Lim Thai Su（林府太師） ○
38 紫連宮 Ban Pasak Thalang Kuan Wu（関羽） ○
39 五顯大帝 Ban Kian Thalang Ngo Hian Tai Te（五顯大帝） ○
40 協天大帝 Hiap Thian Thalang Kuan Wu（関羽） ○
41 武當山 Pa Khrong Chip Thalang Yok Ong Song Te（玉皇上帝） ○
42 靛𦊆壇 Thi Kong Thua Muang Yok Ong Song Te（玉皇上帝） ○
Shrines of Muslim Locality Gods
43 San Pho Ta To Se Muang To Sae ○
44 San Pho Ta To Se Muang To Sae ○
45 San To Hin Khao Muang To Hin Khao ○
46 卓他米 Pho Ta To Sami Muang To Sami ○
47 Ban To Yet Kathu To Yet, To Ya ○







Muang Pun Thao Kong（本頭公／福徳正神） ○
50 清普洞 Kuson Tham Muang He Ye Yun（何野雲佛祖） ○ Kuson Tham
9) Currently, daoshi, the Taoist specialist is absent in Phuket (Cohen 2001, 186).
10) This ritual is also called the Hungry Ghost Festival (DeBernardi 1984).
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For this reason the people of each community set aside a day for the collective feasting 
of these spirits by offering meals.  Pho To Kong (Pudugong 普度公) is a leading figure of 
this ritual.  Deemed the representative of hell, he is placed at the end of offering tables.  A 
small image of Kuan Im is put on the head of Pho To Kong, after which songkeng is per-
formed to start the ceremony.  Then this bloodthirsty demon of hell is transferred to a 
subordinate or to another incarnation of Kuan Im, called Kuan Im Tai Su (Guanyin Dashi 
觀音大士).  Pho To Kong receives offerings on behalf of the dead and, in return, gives 
blessings to the living before he is finally burned and sent off from the coast at midnight.
Here is clearly manifested the main theme of universal salvation in the Mahayana 
Buddhist tradition.  Nevertheless this “Buddhist” annual ritual is conducted without 
ordained monks, with the exception of the Pho To ceremony held on the street in front 
of the municipal market, in which Theravada monks from nearby Buddhist temples are 
invited for chanting (suat mon).  The presence of Theravada monks is not a necessary 
condition of the ritual; after all, there is no need to invite monks to “Buddhist” rituals as 
long as somebody can perform songkeng.  Although knowledge of songkeng is passed down 
through apprenticeship, this network is formed on an informal basis without any institu-
tionalized body.  Officially speaking, in accordance with the state’s definition of satsana
and satsanasathan, chanting by laymen in “non-religious places” has nothing to do with 
religion.  The fact that there is no ordained religious specialist means that the government 
has no control over those who conduct Chinese religious rituals.  The absence of ordained 
monks in Chinese temples contributes to their invisibility in the context of religious 
administration targeting officially recognized monks and religious places.11)
Table 8 Schedule of Pho To Rituals in Phuket City (in Seventh Month of Chinese Lunar Calendar)
Date Venue Notes
13th Former Thaihua School (presently Thaihua Museum)* Tapo community
15th Cho Su Kong Temple
16th Cho Ong Temple
17th–18th Municipal market
19th Pho To Kong Temple
20th Former Thaihua School* Kian Tek Pho**
21st Ao Ke community
24th Pho To Kong Temple
Note: * The Thaihua School Campus was formerly a Chinese temple and the headquarters of the Kian 
Tek secret society.
** Propitiation ritual for deceased Kian Tek leaders.
11) The absence of resident monks in temples was not exceptional in traditional China.  See Yang (1991, 
309–310).
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To question the relationship between religion and non-religion, finally we consider 
the concept of merit-making.  Thambun is the Thai term for merit-making, and this has 
been argued to mean making contributions to the Sangha through conventional means 
in Thai Buddhism.  However, the coverage of this term in daily usage in Phuket is much 
wider, referring to such activities as attending Chinese temples and making contributions 
to them, the songkeng ritual, the suat mon ritual of Theravada Buddhism, contributions 
to the Sangha, donations to philanthropic foundations, donations to the Red Cross, dona-
tions to native place associations (Hokkien, Hailam, etc.), and donations to Chinese 
schools.  The names of donors are publicly listed during annual ritual occasions according 
to the amount contributed.  The same arrangement is also employed in fund-raising 
initiatives by Chinese schools, native place associations, philanthropic associations as 
well as Chinese temples.  Such donors lists also usually appear in the memorial publica-
tions of these organizations.  Who contributes how much is widely publicized and remem-
bered.  The same local Chinese leaders always occupy the top spots on these lists and 
famous rich persons risk being gossiped about whenever their contributions are smaller 
than public expectations.  These are the reasons why local Chinese leaders compete 
obsessively over donation or merit-making.  Coughlin (1960, 57–58) writes of the Chinese 
society of Bangkok:
Public recognition, community goodwill, and some fame can be gained by donating money to this 
[Tianhua Hospital] and other organizations in the Chinese community. . . .  These are the custom-
ary ways by which the Chinese community recognizes beneficence.  The reports of the Poh Tek 
Associations, for example, list all contributions, large and small alike, pointing out for special men-
tion those who have given large sums.  All Chinese hospitals and charitable associations, and even 
some dialect associations, honour benefactors by hanging their framed pictures in conspicuous 
places on the premises.  This form of recognition shows the part that charity plays in attaining 
social prominence in the community.
Recognition of beneficence in Coughlin’s term corresponds to thambun in Phuket. 
Both of them share the same coverage and function.  In this regard, the Sangha (consist-
ing of Buddhist temples and monks) is by no means the sole center of merit-making.
The wide range of occasions for thambun to take place may seem puzzling in its 
inclusion of apparently secular activities and facilities.  However, when we recall that 
Chinese temples and related activities are placed outside of “religion,” we realize that 
the distinction between “religion” and “non-religion” is already obscure.  It makes no 
sense then to claim that Chinese temples can be centers of merit-making while other 
“secular” organizations may not.  It is this blurring of the categories of “religion” and 
“non-religion” that should be examined instead of questioning the status of the “field of 
merit” of the Red Cross and other associations.
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IV Boundaries of Religion
“Secular” Organizations for Practicing Chinese Religious Traditions
Chinese temples do not have a monopoly on the domain of “non-religious places” for 
practicing Chinese religious tradition.  Other related facilities, whose functions overlap 
those of Chinese temples, also offer occasions for worshipping Chinese deities.
One example of the complexity of the issue is the boundary between temples and 
associations.  A good example is the Hainanese Association (No. 16 in Table 7).  Its Chi-
nese name (Hainan Huiguan海南會館/Kengjiu Huiguan瓊州會館) gives the impression 
that it is nothing other than an association by place of origin.  Interestingly though, its 
Thai name is Sanchao Hailam, meaning “Hainanese temple,” and it is officially registered 
as a private temple.  On the other hand, the Hokkien Association in Phuket is not a 
registered temple, but it contains a worship altar and claims Pun Thao Kong or Fude 
Zhengshen as owner of the association.  Yet these two associations actually share the 
same functions as places of worship and care of descendants.
We can make the same observations of philanthropic foundations.  Qing Pu Dong 清
普洞 (No. 50) is a worship building of the Phuket branch of the Kuson Tham Foundation, 
one of the major Chinese philanthropic foundations in Thailand.  This foundation has the 
character of a new religion worshipping He Ye Yun Fozu 何野雲佛祖, a former Mahayana 
monk in Mainland China, as its founding father, and the structure of the building is 
similar to that of other Chinese temples; yet Qing Pu Dong has never been registered as 
a religious place or a Chinese temple.  Here we should note that some of the other 
Chinese temples in Phuket are also registered as philanthropic foundations.  Temples 
No. 1, 5, 7, 8, 19, and 24 (Table 7) are such examples, and they run the gamut of Chinese 
temple categories, namely, state temple, private temple, and non-registered temple.  In 
fact, there is no clear distinction between these non-registered Chinese temples and 
philanthropic foundations such as Kuson Tham.
The distinction between altars in private houses and Chinese temples is also obscure. 
Some private altars are open to outside visitors and may eventually become Chinese 
temples when the number of visitors increases.  In fact, many Chinese temples evolved 
from shrines in private houses.  This is the general tendency of development of Chinese 
temples.  Tan (1990, 6) comments on Chinese temples of Malaysia that “[s]ometimes a 
community temple had its beginnings in a simple shrine, originally patronized only by a 
few families.”
Formoso (1996, 255) points out that Chinese philanthropic associations in Thailand 
are less likely to officially declare themselves as religious organizations.
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Although the foundations keep alive in Thailand a Chinese religious tradition, this is not their 
official purpose.  The objectives they present to the authorities include material assistance to the 
poor and emergency relief for victims of fires, flood, and other disasters, and they give maximum 
publicity to these activities.
This is why all their activities remain outside the official category of “religion” in 
Thailand.  The most typical example of such a foundation-like religion officially registered 
as a secular body is Dejiao.  As we have seen above, all the branches of this new religious 
movement are registered as philanthropic foundations.  Hence their official names are 
shantang 善堂 (philanthropic association), not Dejiao, even though their activities are 
deeply motivated and guided by divine messages delivered from automatic writing.12)
Li Daoji (1999, 246), who based his research on 510 Chinese associations in Thailand 
that appeared in a local Chinese newspaper of 1988, highlights the fact that out of 78 
associations engaged in religious activities, 73 are philanthropic associations.  This figure 
demonstrates that such self-proclaimed “secular” philanthropic associations provide 
fields of religious activities to supplement Chinese temples as “non-religious places.” 
As I have mentioned earlier, even more “secular” organizations such as Chinese-owned 
hospitals have overlapping functions with Chinese temples and semi-religious (but offi-
cially secular) associations as centers of worship of Chinese deities and of merit-making 
for Chinese statistical Buddhists.
“Chinese Religion” and Southeast Asian States
The blurred distinction between “religion” and “non-religion,” and the obscure bounda-
ries between each religion reflect the very nature of Chinese religious tradition.  Tan 
(1995, 140) argues that:
Chinese Religion is a religion of the Chinese civilization, and it is a religion which historically has 
become part and parcel of that civilization.  As such, the Chinese have not found it necessary to 
have a special name for this complex system of beliefs and practices which are, after all, part and 
parcel of their way of life.  In this respect, they are like many other peoples, such as the Orang Asli 
(aborigines of Peninsular Malaysia) and the Iban in Sarawak, who do not have specific names for 
that indigenous complex we call “religion.”
Religious practices of the Chinese elude the modern categorization of religion and 
profanity, and the institutionalization of individual religions.  In this respect, the term 
“Buddhism” for the Chinese has a different implication from the Thai state’s official 
understanding.  According to Tan again (ibid., 139):
12) Automatic writing is a way of divination popular among the Chinese in Southeast Asia.  See Heinze 
(1983) for details.
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As part of the Chinese system, Chinese Buddhism is also closely associated with Chinese Religion, 
especially from the point of view of worshippers who do not draw an exclusive boundary between 
what is Buddhist and what is indigenous Chinese, or distinguish between what is Chinese Religion 
and “pure” Buddhism.
Chinese Buddhism, as a part of the anonymous Chinese Religion in a broader sense, 
forms a stark contrast to the Theravada Sangha protected by the state.  This setting of 
Buddhism in Thailand, which detracts from the state Sangha as the sole organization 
representing Buddhism, further contributes to the in-between status of Chinese temples, 
resulting in a puzzling state in which Chinese temples are “non-religious” but their fol-
lowers are Buddhists.
Yang’s classical model of traditional Chinese religion seems to be applicable to the 
situation of the Chinese temples in Thailand.  He employs the term “diffused religion” 
to explain the special character of traditional Chinese religion as compared to “institu-
tionalized religion.”  Diffused religion in his sense is a religion scattered and embedded 
in various secular social institutions with no significant independent and separate exis-
tence (Yang 1991, 294–295).
People visited a particular temple, worshipped a particular spirit, called on a particular priest, all 
in accordance with the practical function of religion for the particular occasion.  To what religion a 
temple or a god belonged might be a puzzle to many academicians, but such questions had no 
functional significance in the religious life of the common people. (ibid., 340)
“Chinese Religion” is likely to have operated outside state control since the imperial 
period of traditional China, where political authority paid little attention to theological 
issues of dissident sects.  Actually, “some 84 percent of the temples in China in the 
seventeenth century were built without official permission, and this figure obviously did 
not include the numerous small shrines privately built” (ibid., 214–215).
Such a “diffused” nature of Chinese religion might be advantageous in some respects 
when it is transplanted in Southeast Asian socio-political environments.  For example, 
in Malaysia, where government concern in religious affairs is almost solely concentrated 
on Islam as a state religion, Chinese Religion enjoys relative freedom and flexibility in a 
diffused and syncretic form (Tan 1995, 154; Ackerman and Lee 1988, 52).  Yang (1991) 
describes Chinese Buddhism as an example of “institutionalized religion”—an opposite 
counterpart of “diffused religion,” since the former has a (relatively) more institutional-
ized monkhood and theology as compared to the latter.  However, in some Southeast 
Asian countries, even such a religious tradition originally oriented to institutionalization 
has been incorporated into the syncretic amalgam of “diffused religion.”  One of the 
causes is the indifference of the local governments toward non-state religions.  Thailand 
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is unique in its divide is between “State Buddhism” and others.  The fact that Buddhism 
of the Theravada school is the de facto state religion has meant that most “Chinese Bud-
dhism” is categorized as “Chinese Religion,” and hence “non-religion” in official state 
administration.
Lim’s recent case study of Yiguan Dao一貫道 in Singapore demonstrates clearly 
that the status of non-religion is a possible alternative strategy for Chinese religious 
traditions to avoid state control and maintain a free hand: “[O]ne of the Yiguan Dao’s 
most important proselytising efforts is not conducted in the public ‘religious domain’ as 
defined by the Singaporean state, hence overcoming certain restrictions faced by the 
other public religions” (Lim 2012, 21).  Religion itself has been a major field of negotiation 
for Asian religious traditions.  Such traditions have used various strategies to cope with—
or “circumvent” (ibid.)—“religion” imposed by modernizing states.13)  Chinese temples 
and related organizations in Thailand show that these are synthetic compounds in the 
intersection of “Chinese religion” and Thai-style (Theravada Buddhist-oriented) inter-
pretation and operation of Western concepts of “religion.”
V Conclusions
In 1976, Wee (1976, 155) wrote of Buddhism in Singapore:
Buddhism is generally considered to be one of the major religions, if not the major religion of 
multiracial Singapore.  But on closer examination, one discovers that the word “Buddhism” is 
actually used as a religious label by a variety of people in Singapore whose religious practices and 
beliefs do not necessarily correspond to those prescribed by the Buddhist scriptures. . . .  About 
50 percent of Singapore’s population declare themselves to be “Buddhists.”  But despite their 
usage of a single religious label, the “Buddhists” of Singapore do not in fact share a unitary religion. 
As we shall see, “Buddhism” of Singapore shows such a range of beliefs, practices and institutions 
that it can be structured analytically into distinct and separate religious systems.
Our overview of the state of Chinese temples in Thailand tells us that Thailand is 
not as far off from the Singaporean case as we would expect—at least in terms of the 
hybrid variety of Buddhism and related traditions.  “Thai Buddhism” appears as a unitary 
religion simply because unorthodox Buddhism-related traditions are, with the exception 
of a very small number of Mahayana temples, practiced outside “religion.”  This ambig-
uous usage of “Buddhism” at the statistical level reflects a broader definition that encom-
passes the official structure of the government policy towards religion.  Again, Wee’s 
13) See “Introduction” to this special issue.
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following comment on Singaporean Buddhism can also be applied to Thailand.
The Chinese syncretic religions practiced in Singapore are often referred to as “Buddhism” . . . . 
[F]or a significant proportion, if not the majority of “Buddhism” in Singapore, “Buddhism” is all-
inclusive, embracing both Canonical Buddhism and the Chinese syncretic religions, and extending 
sometimes even to Hinduism.14)
For the Phuket case, as we have seen, we might add that “such all-inclusive Bud-
dhism is extended even to Hinduism and some Islamic deities.”
We commonly understand Thailand to be a Buddhist state (in this context, Buddhism 
denotes exclusively Theravada Buddhism), and through “common sense,” we equate the 
worship of deities in Chinese temples with religion.  Yet this “logical” understanding is 
only partially true.  In the first place, statistical Buddhists encompass a very wide section 
(over 90 percent) of Thai society, and many religious traditions other than Theravada 
Buddhism have been incorporated into this “Buddhist” state.  The second assumption 
also becomes questionable when we examine official religious discourse in Thailand—
followers of Chinese temples are regarded as Buddhists, while the temples themselves 
have no room in the officially defined domain of religion.
Chinese temples as “religion-as-non-religion” are by-products of the formation of 
the “Buddhist ecclesia” (Ishii 1986) and the institutionalization of religion, two processes 
that are closely associated.  As such, religion was re-defined to denote officially recog-
nized institutions with doctrine and ordained specialists.  The result is that this narrow 
concept of religion has left a very large residual domain.  The case of the Chinese temples 
in Phuket shows that differentiation between religion and non-religion, and differentiation 
among institutionalized religions, remains minimal on the practical level.  We have also 
seen how previous arguments on “Thai Buddhism” seem to have relied on this unreal-
istic definition of religion.
At the same time, the state of Chinese temples lying outside religion is beneficial 
to both institutionalized religions and Chinese temples.  The state and institutionalized 
Buddhism can absorb the attendants of Chinese temples into the statistical category of 
Buddhism to maintain the uniform image of “Thai Buddhism.”  On the other hand,  Chinese 
temples can enjoy freedom from state intervention without challenging the official claim 
of the purity of state Buddhism.  Also, since they are not recognized as representing 
religion, they are not forced to select any one institutionalized religion through which to 
“purify” their pantheons.  This contributes to the persistence of indiscriminative syn-
cretism in the grassroots practices of Thai Buddhism.
14) Actually some Hindu temples and shrines in Bangkok (for example, the so-called “Wat Khaek” at 
Silom) are full of Chinese worshippers who would claim to be Buddhists.
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This brief case study of Chinese temples implies that many facilities for religious 
activities still remain outside “religion” and “religious places.”  Comparative studies on 
the worship facilities of self-claimed Buddhists in Thailand, such as the Chinese, the 
highlanders, and other ethnic minorities, as well as the Thai-speaking peoples, will dis-
close similar discrepancies between official categorization and actual religious practice. 
My hypothesis is that the vitality and energy of the religious landscape of Thailand 
originated from this very discrepancy, although a brief overview such as presented in 
this paper is only a first step toward proving it.
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